Borrowing a Uniting Concept:

The Use of Nationalist Strategies by the European Union

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Introduction

"A people destined to achieve great things for the welfare of humanity must one day or other be constituted a nation"[1]

"We are a community of destiny. ... the need for our common future to take a creative form ... demand that our ... order should be federal in structure, thereby stimulating a sense of common purpose and ... identity."[2]

These two quotes represent two different centuries, two different political units, but the same idea. The first citation is from Italian nationalist Guiseppe Mazzini, who tried to build a united Italy in the 19th century. The second quote is from a 20th century movement, the "Union of European Federalist". This organization is also trying to build a nation. The Union of European Federalist wants to unite the European Union to a nation-state.

The parallelism in pursuing the goal of unity is not evident in these two quotes only. The central thesis of this work is that the European Union today is heavily borrowing from, one could even say copying, the strategies of national movements, which have successfully created unity in the past. This work will show how the seemingly old concepts of creating unity are being applied by the EU in order to foster a common European identity.

Critics may argue that the strategies of creating unity are far older than nationalism and thus represent more general patterns of social life than nationalist attributes. Of course, social groups have always used certain methods to foster a common identity in order to legitimate leadership, goals and social responsibility. However, before the age of nationalism, leadership, as a rule, was passively legitimized by "tradition" or "charisma".[3] Only the transformation of political and philosophical ideas in the course of enlightenment led to the need for a widespread active legitimization of power by large groups of population within a country. Nationalism scholar Hans Kohn writes: "*Nationalism was the affirmation of individual freedom from authority.... For the first time the authoritarian tradition on which the Church and the State had rested, was challenged ...*"[4] This radical switch in legitimization had a great impact on the importance of creating unity and a common identity. Before nationalism, the consent of the population was of limited importance for the ruler of a country. With the emergence of nationalism it became the single most important condition to obtain, legitimize and maintain power. Thus, the asserting and fostering of a common identity must be seen as the main structuring principle of nationalism.

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[1] Kohn, Hans: Nationalism: Its Meaning and History; Princeton; 1965; p. 119

[2] Webpage Europa Union: A Charta of European Identity - http://www.europa-web.de:80/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

[3] As Max Weber pointed out in his typology of three forms of legitimization (traditional, charismatic and rational)

[4] Kohn, Hans: Nationalism: Its Meaning and History; Princeton; 1965; p. 16

So while uniting strategies may have existed before, they gained substantial importance, when they became a precondition for the success of nationalist movements. Obviously this led to an extensive use of uniting strategies by nationalist movements[5], which , so to speak , became the experts in building unity among a people. This is the reason, why this work links uniting strategies to the idea of nationalism and to national movements.

In order to show the connection between nationalist strategies and the concepts of the European Union, this work is conceptually divided into two analytical parts.

The first provides a theoretical discussion of methods, arguments, and strategies used by national movements to unite a people. In a second step, this theoretical concept is tested on the case of policies, public relations and publications of the European Union.

German texts, which have not been published in English, are translated by the author as closely as possible. This is marked in the footnotes by (translation: BS).

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[5] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; 263ff

1   Theoretical Categorization of Uniting Strategies Used by National Movements

1.1	Symbols of Unity

"*The National Flag, the National Anthem and the National Emblem are the three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty ... In themselves they reflect the entire background, thought and culture of a nation.*"[6]

This first chapter shall examine the role of national symbols in building a national identity. Throughout history, states have always used symbols. However, it must be noted that many new symbols and devices only came into existence or became emotionally charged in connection with the emergence of the nation state.[7] This can be shown most clearly in the case of the national anthem and the national flag.

"*The patriotic anthem came into being in the 18th century together with the emergence of modern national feelings.*"[8] Most of today's anthems were established along with the creation of the corresponding nation. Accordingly, two very old nations are seen as leaders in the evolution of a uniting song: The British hymn (1619 or 1740[9]) and the Geusenlied of the Neatherlands are commonly thought to be the forerunners in the case of the patriotic anthem.[10]

A similar development applies to the national flag, which is thought to derive from the French revolutionary tricolour evolving 1790 to 1794[11].

Another symbol, which typically came up with the emergence of the nation-state, is the personification of 'the nation'.[12] This has sometimes been official state policy like Marianne for the French republic and sometimes an unofficial attachment to a nation like "Uncle Sam" for the US and the "Deutscher Michel" for Germany.

Most political scientists argue that "*no state can survive without symbols. Symbols are needed to point out to the presence or the power of the state.*"[13] This is especially true for the nation-state, which embraced and perfected the concept of state symbols in its core identifiers flag, anthem and personification

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[6] Official Indian government commentary, quoted in Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 11

[7] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 7

[8] Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (eds): Die Nationalhymnen der Erde; München; 1958; p. 7 (translation: BS)

[9] Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (eds): Die Nationalhymnen der Erde; München; 1958; p. 7, 50

[10] Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (eds): Die Nationalhymnen der Erde; München; 1958; p.7

[11] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 7

[12] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 7

[13] Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (eds): Nationale Symbole und Nationale Identität; Berlin; 1985; p. 1 (translation: BS)

1.2 Language

Many theorists point to language as a very strong force behind nationalism and nationalist integration. Joshua Fishman sees "*the vernacular as the medium of nationalism*"[14] and analyzes that "*...national movements have very commonly utilized and championed vernaculars in order to attain their particular broader integrating and authenticating goals*"[15]. For him language is the core of a nation. It provides the link with a nation's history, expresses the individual soul of a people, links it with authenticity and gives means of self-identification. [16]

After stating this immense importance of language for nationalism, Fishman goes one step further in his argumentation. He analyzes the attempts of nationalist movements to actively form a unified language or script, which he calls "*language planning*"[17]. There are numerous historical cases of such policies, for example Turkey (which created a new identity after WWI by replacing the Arabic script by the Roman), Finish, Estonian, or Hindi.

Hence, language plays a double role in nationalism. Firstly, a vernacular is a major integration force and secondly, language is often used very strategically by nationalist movements.

1.3 The Invention of Tradition - Perceptions of Culture and History

"Getting the history wrong is part of being a nation" (Ernest Renan)[18]

One of the main contributions to the study of nationalism by Eric Hobsbawm is his observation of the invention of tradition. "*So much of what subjectively makes up the modern 'nation', consists of such constructs [invented traditions], and is associated with ... symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as history).*"[19] In his point of view, nationalist ideologies have often recreated symbols and traditions and thus established their own past to reach social cohesion and socialization[20]. And though the invention of tradition is not exclusively a nationalist strategy, nationalist movements have carried the process of invention to extremes due to their revolutionary nature. Hobsbawm states that "*plenty of ... ideological movements and groups, - not least in nationalism – were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented, for example by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity, either by semi-fiction (Boadicea, Vercingetorix, ...) or by forgery (Ossian ...).*"[21] One important characteristic of

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[14] Fishman, Joshua: Language and Nationalism. Two integrative Essays; Rowley, 1972; p. 40

[15] Fishman, Joshua: Language and Nationalism. Two integrative Essays; Rowley, 1972; p. 40

[16] Fishman, Joshua: Language and Nationalism. Two integrative Essays; Rowley, 1972; p. 44-55

[17] Fishman, Joshua: Language and Nationalism. Two integrative Essays; Rowley, 1972; p. 55ff

[18] "L'erreur historique ... un facteur essentiel de la formation d'une nation" quoted in Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Cambridge; 1991; p. 12

[19] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 14

[20] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 9

[21] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 7

such invented history is a special emphasis on myths rather than chronological facts, on a mythological past[22] rather than a rational view of history.

The invention of a common heritage is not only stressed by Hobsbawm. Ernest Gellner writes that "*nationalism ... sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures*".[23]

Three factors must thus be seen as major elements for the creation of a common identity through culture and history: national movements recreate symbols and traditions, invent a mystical historical past and reinterpret previous cultures as a national heritage.

1.4	Other Strategies of Emotional Integration and Exclusion

"*Why and how could a concept so remote from the real experience of most human beings as 'national patriotism' become such a powerful political force so quickly?*", asks Eric Hobsbawm.[24]

He answers the rhetorical question with an analysis of psychological strategies pursued by national movements in order to unite a people. According to Hobsbawm and other scholars of nationalism exclusion is the major tool, which is often used to create such powerful common identifications. The concept goes back to the ancient basic distinction between member and stranger. Thereby, Nationalism uses and "*mobilize[s] certain variants of feelings of collective belongings which already existed...*"[25].

Hobsbawm analyses in the following that these exclusive feelings can be activated by different ideologies.[26] However, it is crucial in his point of view that the feeling of "imaged communities"[27] is created and fostered by elites in an emotional approach. Joshua Fishman asserts the centrality of elites in nationalist activation: "*These protoelites, then, are the essential synthesizers, separators, popularizers, and organizers on whom the spread of nationalism depends.*"[28] The elites are the ones, who create identity by stressing, redefining and inventing common bonds like history, language or destiny. Hobsbawm calls this strategy by elites "*conscious and deliberate ideological engineering*"[29].

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[22] Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983; p. 7

[23] Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism; Oxford; 1983; p. 48-49

[24] Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Cambridge; 1991; p. 46

[25] Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Cambridge; 1991; p. 47 Hobsbawm calls "these bonds ‚proto-national‘"

[26] Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Cambridge; 1991; p. 48-79, like popular myths, common language, ethnicity, religion or the belonging to a lasting political entity

[27] Anderson, Benedict: Imaged Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism; London;1991; p. 6f

[28] Fishman, Joshua: Language and Nationalism. Two integrative Essays; Rowley, 1972; p. 16

[29] Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Cambridge; 1991; p. 92

This policy is supposed to lead to a enthusiastically "nationalist people", which is not only defined by the distinction between member and stranger, but also by the exclusiveness of loyalty and feelings of identity. Hobsbawm states that a major principle of nationalism "*implies that the political duty ... overrides all other public obligations*".[30]

To sum up this approach, one can say that national identities are predominantly formed through fostering feelings of unity by exclusion. This "ideological engineering" is characterized by a emotional and sometimes radical approach.

1.5	Summary of Uniting Strategies Used by National Movements

Four categories of uniting strategies can be summarized in conclusion of the preceding four chapters:

Strategy	Components
Symbols of Unity	♦ national flag ♦ national anthem ♦ national emblem ♦ personification of nation
Language	♦ "language planning": policies to form a unifying vernacular ♦ politicizing language as a "soul" of a nation
Invention of Tradition	♦ identity-building by recreating symbols and traditions ♦ invention of history with myths of origin ♦ reinterpretation of cultures as a national heritage
Other strategies of - emotional integration - exclusion	"ideological engineering": ♦ creation of identity by emotional distinction between group and ("hostile") environment ♦ emotional and radical fostering of national ideologies ♦ an elite as the driving force behind "ideological engineering"

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[30] Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Cambridge; 1991; p. 9

2 The Use of Nationalist Strategies, Arguments and Symbols by the EU

The strategies discussed above will now be tested on the concrete case of the European Union (EU). This approach provide the means to determine, to what degree the European Union borrows from nationalist *modi operandi* in order to create a common identity.

2.1 Symbols of Unity: From Flag to License Plate

In the case of symbols, the reference to 19th century characteristics is astonishingly strong. The EU uses all core symbols of a nation-state as well as more sophisticated attributes of a nation:

2.1.1 Flag

The (then) European Communities officially introduced their flag in 1986: it shows a circle of 12 gold stars on a blue background.[31] The number of stars, incidentally, has nothing to do with the number of Member States; it symbolizes perfection, the circle stands for unity. The flag is adopted from the Council of Europe, which introduced it in 1955.[32] Despite the late introduction, the flag has become the single most powerful symbol of the European Union so far. The EU extensively uses it on publications and meetings and encourages pushes its distribution.[33] Thus, the European flag has quickly become a widely known visual synonym for the European Union.

2.1.2 Anthem

The anthem of the European Union was also borrowed from the Council of Europe. The Council adopted 'Ode to Joy', prelude to the final movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's 9th Symphony, in 1972 as the official European anthem. Incidentally, 'Ode to Joy' had already been used as a national anthem before the EU. When West and East Germany had a common Olympic team after World War II and could not agree on a hymn to be played during the Games, they chose 'Ode to Joy' as a compromise.

The 9th Symphony (Op. 125) is Beethoven's last symphonic work. It was first presented in 1824 in Vienna and is dedicated to "Friedrich Wilhelm III, König von Preußen". 'Ode to Joy' was originally a vocal song; Beethoven took the text from Friedrich Schiller's poem "An die Freude", which Schiller wrote in 1785. Interestingly, the version of the Council of Europe and the European Union dropped the vocal text, 'the EU-Ode to Joy' is arranged for instruments only. It is no coincidence that the German text

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[31] Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe from A to Z; 1997 (CD-Rom); p. 231

[32] Webpage Council of Europe: European Flag - http://www.coe.fr/50/english/eanniversaire/edrapeau.htm The flag had been chosen in a design contest and it took five years to agree on one proposal.

[33] Webpage EU: The European Emblem http://www.europa.eu.int/en/eu/emblem.html even includes a description how "to help those who use the European emblem to reproduce it correctly"

of the ode (and the dedication) "disappeared". This strategy is a good example of the reinterpretation of cultural heritage into "European" heritage, which will be discussed more extensively later[34]. The link between the imagined "old European" song and the political project of today is a classical strategy in the sense of Hobsbawm theory.[35]

2.1.3   European Passport

In 1975 the European Council in Rome agreed to introduce a European passport.[36] EU passports have a similar design (magenta color) in all member states; the title "European Union" prominently appears on the cover above the name of the respective nation. This paper will argue that the concept of a common passport created a very important symbol: It is not an accident that a passport is also traditionally called "identity card". A passport is a very strong sign of identification and emotional attachment. This can be shown by many historical examples. In World War II, for example, an American passport could be a life-saver and helped many refugees to escape from Nazi Germany.

The symbolic power of the EU passport not only works through design. It creates far stronger symbols. Today each passenger, who flies to Europe from overseas, faces a clear division: there is one row for Europeans, and one for all others nationalities at the customs gate. This symbol has two consequences: It unites all Europeans, who are no longer "foreigners" in any European county, and it figuratively excludes all "non-Europeans". In this sense, a common passport must be seen as a very strategic and successful invention of the EU.[37]

2.1.4   Other Symbols

Besides the core symbols of a nation the EU has established a number of other symbols of unity among European citizens. One is the uniform driving license and license plate with the European flag. The effect of such emblems should not be underestimated, given the number of actual license plates and the emotional attachment, which many people have to their car and its "signs of identity".

Other symbols used by the EU are annually awarded European prizes and European welcome signs which replace the customs signs at internal borders.

Interestingly, one symbol is missing in this case-study of the EU. The theoretical categories of uniting symbols would predict that the EU uses a personification as a tool for increased unity.[38] However, there is no such attempt by the EU. Yet it would be easy to personify "Europe". After all, the term named a person, the mythological Greek goddess "Europa", before referring to a continent.

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[34] Compare to chapter 2.3 Perceptions of Culture and History: The Invention of Tradition

[35] Compare to chapter 1.3 The Invention of Tradition - Perceptions of Culture and History.

[36] Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe from A to Z; 1997 (CD-Rom); p. 255

[37] This is not a comment about the political implications of a common passports like the rights as a European citizen, it is an analysis of the quasi-automatic creation of unity by this sign.

[38] Compare to chapter 1.1 Symbols of Unity

2.2	Language: Multilingualism and "Money Talks"

If the theoretical assumptions about language and nationalism[39] are applied to the European Union, the EU would be expected to create a common vernacular as a major integration force. However, the situation within the EU is complicated with regard to language.

First there is no vernacular nor are there different dialects of one original language. Instead, one can find eleven official languages[40] alone within the EU, which differ to a great extend in terms of origin, grammar and pronunciation.

Second, the nation-states within the union are very sensitive about any attempt of the EU to take away any power in culture and language policies. This can be shown concretely in the case of the most recent "language-scandal" within the EU. At the beginning of the Finnish presidency over the EU, the country heavily clashed with Germany over the question, whether German should be accepted as third official language after English and French at informal council meetings.[41]

In general, culture requires the strictest institutional hurdles as a sphere of activity for the European Union. First , the Council is forced to reach all its decisions in this field unanimously. Second, the Committee of the Regions has to be consulted and third, a harmonization of national legislation and administrative regulations in the field of cultural policies is expressly ruled out. [42]

It is very interesting that one can nonetheless find evidence of "language planning" by the EU, although the conditions are so unfavorable.

2.2.1 Multilingualism as the European Vernacular

The main strategy of the EU is to create a new form of multilingualism, which may be called "double or triple -vernaculars". In this sense, a European common language is achieved by having all Europeans speak two of three of the eleven EU languages as second and third "mother tongue". In the moment, only 45 percent of EU citizens can take part in a conversation in another language than their mother tongue.[43] The average number of foreign languages taught per pupil in secondary education is about 1,3 EU-wide (Germany 1,2 / Luxembourg 1,9 / Spain 1,0).[44]

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[39] Compare to chapter 1.2 Language

[40] Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe from A to Z; 1997 (CD-Rom); p. 240-241

[41] Agence France Presse: Latein; in: Der Tagesspiegel Berlin; 8.7.1999; p. 27

[42] Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe from A to Z; 1997 (CD-Rom); p. 59

[43] European Commission: Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union; Brussels; 1999; p. 108

[44] Office for Official Publications of the European Communities: Facts through Figures; Luxembourg; 1998; p. 4

Knowledge of English, French, German and Spanish as a "second" language (percent)[45]

Language	1990	1998	Difference
English	23	31	+8
French	11	12	+1
German	7	8	+1
Spanish	5	4	-1

"*The Community aims to ... develop a European dimension to education, particularly by the dissemination and learning of the languages of the Member States*"[46].

This strategy is mainly conducted by addressing future European generations through "networking the youth". Among the concrete programs are

♦ educational exchange programs like SOCRATES and LEONARDO[47]

♦ the fostering of teaching EU languages in high schools

♦ youth exchange programs and partnerships e.g. city partnerships

The high priority of the programs within the EU policy framework can be proved by the figures of the participants. Every year some 48 000 students take part in inter-university mobility for a period averaging seven months. Some 15 000 young people participate in training courses in a country of the Union other than their own. 10 000 language study visits are organized and 6 000 teachers are given language training courses.[48]

Moreover, the idea of "double or triple -vernaculars" is also supported by the general EU-policy of the "Freedom of movement for persons". This principle means that Union citizens have the basic right to live, work and spend their retirement anywhere they like in the European Union.[49] The effect is an increase in (social) mobility and the use of several languages as "mother tongue".

It should be mentioned here that models for international vernaculars exists. One example is "Esperanto". Esperanto was developed in the end of the 19th century by L.L. Zamenhof of Warsaw, Poland (then Russia). However, the artificial language was not able to find a broader community of knowledgeable speakers and today finds interest mainly among linguists.

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[45] Source: European Commission: Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union; Brussels; 1999; p. 111

[46] Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe from A to Z; 1997 (CD-Rom); p. 83

[47] European Commission: Education and Training. Tackling unemployment; 1995
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/publications/brochures/move/infoeduc/educform/cover_en.html

[48] European Commission: Education and Training. Tackling unemployment; 1995
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/publications/brochures/move/infoeduc/educform/cover_en.html

[49] Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe from A to Z; 1997 (CD-Rom); p. 234

2.2.2 Currency as the European Vernacular

Traditionally, language is seen as a set of signs and symbols (words), which serve as a means to form and disseminate thoughts as well as fix knowledge[50]. It may be fruitful, however, to broaden this definition by including another "medium": money defined by a currency. After all, a currency provides a set of references to things just like a "word-language". Theses references are interpreted by the people, who know the currency.[51] In this sense, currency falls into accepted theories of communication by language: "*Human communication must be seen as symbolically mediated interaction. ... If at least parts of the symbols are mutually known and accepted, communication and understanding is ensured.*"[52]

Thus the EU created a "new vernacular" last year, when it adopted the common currency, the Euro in eight of the eleven member states ("Euroland"). Of course, this "language" cannot replace a common word-language Still, there may be a lot more of "understanding" between the different citizens of Euroland, when they gain a common reference to things in 2001. However, the concept of currency as a language must be restricted, if one goes back to the theoretical analysis of the first chapters: Money is not able to carry as much emotions as a vernacular does, which explains large part of its importance for nationalism. Nevertheless, the example of Germany shows that currency may well have emotional power. Many Germans are deeply attached to the "DM". Additionally to this presumable effect, the Euro again will produce more symbols of unity through billions of coins and notes.

2.3 Perceptions of Culture and History: The Invention of Tradition

2.3.1 Reframing History

In what way is the European Union reframing history in order to create a united past? The European anthem was already mentioned as one example for the attempt to reinterpret history as European History. A multitude of other such cases come to light, if one analyses official European documents, publications and statements.

The brochure "How does the European Union work" published by the European Commission begins with the following two sentences: "*What are the origins of the European Union? The idea of Europe is an old one - it even takes its name from a character in Greek mythology.*"[53] It must be noted that the book starts by stressing a common origin, although the rest of the brochure deals with the functions of the EU-institutions. It is a common feature of many EU-publications, that they go back 2000 years in time to discuss questions like the European currency, Youth in Europe or the budget of the EU. The same pattern appear in many European speeches. For example, Václav Havel stated to the European Parliament in

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[50] Dudenverlag (eds): Das neue Duden Lexikon, Wien; 1989 p. 3581

[51] This effect can be experienced by taking a vacation in a country with a foreign currency. After a while, one learns to interpret the figures fo the prices correctly and to translate them into the own currency. The language of the currency is learned ...

[52] Burkart, Roland: Kommunikationswissenschaft; Wien; 1995; p. 52, 56 and p. 38-102 (translation BS)

[53] European Commission**:** How does the European Union work; Brussels; 1998; p. 6

Strasbourg on March 8th, 1994 : "*The European Union is based on a large set of values, with roots in antiquity and in Christianity which over 2.000 years evolved into what we recognize today as the foundations of modern democracy, the rule of law, and civil society.*"[54]

The book "Jugend und Europa"[55] is another especially strong piece of evidence for the thesis that the European Union frames and reinterprets historical facts for its own purposes. " Jugend und Europa" is published to promote the chances of Europe for children and students. It must thus be assumed that this target group is not very knowledgeable about historical fact and gets its image through educational publications like " Jugend und Europa". History is prominently addressed in the first essay of the book. The headline is "Europe - unity and diversity". If one acquired history exclusively from this essay, a chronicle of the last 2500 years could be summed up in the following seven points:

1) The Greeks: Important differentiation between "orient" and "occident" - the one being the a slave-master-society (the orient), the other being a community characterized by political freedom of the individual (the occident). Additionally, the Greek are characterized by a unique cleverness, inventiveness and rationality.

2) Roman empire and after: European freedom fighters against foreign influence (like Persians, Huns, Mongols, Turks).

3) Middle Ages: "*Europe unites under the common feature of Christianity*". By living together the elements of modern Europe are formed: a common law, ban on killing prisoners of war, territorial integrity of the monarchic states and centers of culture, commerce and science (e.g. Venice).

4) Pluralization: The modern European state community is formed and Europeans discover the rest of the world. There are rivalries and some wars, but all in all, a unity of European history and a common rationality emerges.

5) Europe as a Center of world politics: up to the First World War, Europe is the center of world politics, European civilization is spread all over the world (by colonialism), and all European people and nations merge more and more.

6) Europe loses its superiority due to foreign powers like "revolutionary Russia" and "democratic-missionary US", eventually being divided as a result of World War II.

7) "European Reunification": "*Even this period of weakness was not able to break European spiritual and political dynamic. After German reunification now we see again the 'the old unity of the continent.*"

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[54] Speech held by the President of the Czech Republic to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on March 8th, 1994 quoted in Webpage Europa Union: A Charta of European Identity - http://www.europa-web.de:80/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

[55] Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit: Jugend und Europa; München; 1992

It is obvious that this historiography is very incomplete, biased, and at least partially false. This can also be evidenced by comparing the above mentioned statements to presentations from neutral historians and political scientists. Frank Pfetsch for example begins his essay about Europe with a statement opposite to the position of " Jugend und Europa". He establishes: "*Historically and politically, Europe has never been a unity*"[56].

How can the historical presentation in " Jugend und Europa" "forget" the protracted religious wars in the Middle Ages, the European fights between restoration and revolution, the genuinely European World War I and beginning of World War II??

This phenomenon can only be explained by the invention of traditions and history through a very special "European" view of history. And like the theories in the first chapters predict, the European Union is establishing a very strategic view of history: It calls for a common origin by the myths of common founding fathers (the Greeks), a common religion (Christianity) and a common history (center of civilization and world politics for 2000 years).

2.3.2 Borrowing Culture

Another theoretical concept, which can be observed in the case of the EU, is the borrowing of elements from pre-existing cultures and the reinterpreting of them as its own heritage.

 The EU explicitly confirms in one core text about cultural policy in the course of European Integration: "*Cultural assets such as the city of Venice, the paintings of Rembrandt, the music of Beethoven or the plays of Shakespeare are an integral part of a common cultural heritage and are regarded as common property by the citizens of Europe*"[57].

Interestingly, this reinterpretation of culture as a European culture cannot only be observed in public relations' texts of the EU, but also in some scientific essays, for example in "The Europe of Cultures" by Stefan Sattler. For him "*the history of the common origin of Europe answers the question ... of a 'cultural house' Europe*"[58] . Again, we find the typical references like "*res publica christiana*", Roman law or the dynamic of science. Political scientist Christoph Bartmann found a name for the phenomenon that sees all forms of culture as somehow "European" and a "common heritage". Bartman named this talk "*the usual cultural Europe-Rhetoric*".[59]

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[56] Pfetsch, Frank: Die Europäische Union; München; 1997; p. 102 (translation BS)

[57] European Commission: European Integration.; Luxembourg; 1995; p. 73

[58] Sattler, Stefan: Das "Europa der Kulturen"; in: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit Europa am Scheideweg; München; 1998; p. 82 (translation BS)

[59] Bartmann, Christoph: Kulturraum Europa? in: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit Europa am Scheideweg; München; 1998; p. 84 (translation BS)

In the context of reframing cultural history also fall concrete projects like the "European City of Culture" program. It was launched by the EU with the goal of "*stressing the community of the European cultural heritage*".[60] Each year one city in Europe gets the title "European City of Culture". The last five "European City of Culture" cities were Stockholm (1998), Thessaloniki (1997), Copenhagen (1996), Luxembourg (1995), Lisbon (1994). In 1999 Weimar, Germany, received the title. Again, we find a reinterpretation of the city's heritage. Weimar's official "European City of Culture"-editorial begins with the statement: "*Weimar is woven into European history with hundreds of strands; innumerable intellectual movements and biographies converge here*"[61]. By such statements German artists like Bach, Goethe, Schiller, Liszt, Wagner and Gropius are monopolized for Europe.

Generally, the EU has been trying to use cultural policies in order to create a common identity since the Treaties of Maastricht. The declared goal is stated in a Commission statement on European cultural policies: "*The principal elements of European integration have historically been economic and commercial, but now the aim is to take it further from a broader base that could involve citizens to a greater degree and strengthen the feeling of belonging to the European Union*"[62]. Active areas of intervention include

♦ the improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples

♦ the conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance (the Raphael, Kaleidoscope and Ariane programmes)

♦ non-commercial cultural exchanges (the Leonardo da Vinci , Socrates , Youth for Europe III , Tempus programmes)

2.3.3 Inventing Traditions

The EU is also active in the field of inventing traditions. One example is the so-called "Europe-Day"[63], which is celebrated on May 9th. The EU introduced this "new tradition" in 1985. The official reason for "Europe-Day" is to commemorate 9 May 1950, when the first move was made towards the creation of the European Union. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman read to the international press a declaration calling France, Germany and other European countries to pool together their coal and steel production in a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). ECSC is seen as "*the first concrete foundation of a European federation*".[64]

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[60] Webpage EU: Culture - "European city of culture" http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/de/lvb/l29005.htm

[61] Webpage Weimar: Editorial - Weimar in Europe http://www.weimar1999.de/english/editorial/editorial.html

[62] Webpage EU: Culture - Current state and prospects: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l29001.htm

[63] Webpage EU: Europe Day, 9 May http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/9-may/index-en.htm

[64] Webpage EU: What is Europe Day? http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/9-may/files/euday-en.htm

Besides the historical memorial, "Europe-Day" also serves a strategic purpose. This day is the attempt to copy the old national memorial days with their longer tradition[65]. Again, the EU acts like a nation-state, which invents traditions to foster a sense of continuity and common history. Hobsbawm and other theorists have given detailed descriptions of this nationalist strategy, which is applied here by the EU.[66]

Even the old nationalist idea of mobilizing all parts of society for memorial day is realized within the EU: "*Europe Day is an opportunity for sharing reflections on our common European identity. National, regional and local authorities; political parties; universities and schools; associations...All should contribute ...*"[67]

2.4	Strategies of Exclusion and Emotional Integration

2.4.1 Strategies of Exclusion

Due to its strict trade and immigration policies, the European Union is often called "Fortress Europe" by many critics. It is not the purpose of this work to discuss any political implications of the "Fortress Europe". However, the immigration policies do also have a social psychological aspect, which can be connected to nationalist strategies. As it was shown in the theoretical part, exclusion is a major tool to create identity. In this sense, "Fortress Europe" policies may have a (side-) effect of creating a European identity by the strict exclusion of "non-Europeans". Again the EU adopts methods and tools, which nationalists have used for centuries.

While this exclusionary strategy may be unintended, it is very interesting to analyze the treaties of the EU with regard to the handling of the concept of identity. Political scientist Frank Pfetsch states, that "*the question of European identity plays a central role in the treaties of the European Union*"[68]. The treaties explicitly deal with the term "identity" twice. First in the preamble saying that the EU be "*Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy..., thereby reinforcing the European identity...*"[69]. The notion of a "European identity" appears a second time in article two of the treaty: "*The Union shall set itself the ... objective[s] ... to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy*"[70]. It is striking that the notion of identity is always linked to foreign policy in the treaties. Obviously, the EU believes that an identity may best be

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[65] Which, in the most cases, are invented, too.

[66] Compare to chapter 2.3 Perceptions of Culture and History and Hobsbawm, Eric/Ranger, Terence (eds): The Invention of Tradition; Cambridge; 1983

[67] Webpage EU: What is Europe Day? http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/9-may/files/euday-en.htm

[68] Pfetsch, Frank: Die Europäische Union; München; 1997; p. 97 (translation BS)

[69] European Union: Consolidated Treaties. Treaty on European Union. Treaty establishing the European Community; Luxembourg; 1997; p 5

[70] European Union: Consolidated Treaties. Treaty on European Union. Treaty establishing the European Community; Luxembourg; 1997; p 8 --- the treaty also acknowledges the national identities on page 9: "The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States."

achieved by stressing the differences towards other actors "on the international scene". Again, the EU implicitly applies the old nationalist principle of "we" against "them".

2.4.2 Strategies of Emotional Integration

The theoretical part of this work stressed the fact that national identities are mainly formed through fostering feelings of unity, this "ideological engineering" being characterized by a threefold approach: emotional, exclusive and sometimes radical. The role of an elite in fostering such an emotional awakening was also mentioned.

In fact, one can find this galvanizing elite on a European level. One could call them the "European nationalists". The overarching goal of the several "European nationalists" groups is to work towards a united Europe. Among the numerous organizations are:

Organization	Statement of Purpose
The European Movement	"... *transform relations between the States and peoples of Europe into a real European Union*."[71]
Union of European Federalists	"*Need to arrive at the convocation of a European Constituent Assembly*"[72]
Europa-Union	German section of UEF/ goal: federal unification of Europe[73]
JEF Europe	Youth organization of Europa-Union
IEI (Initiativkreis für Europäische Integration)	Promoting European integration by student exchange programs
PANEUROPA-UNION	goal of a united Europe based on Christian values[74]

The common feature of all "European Nationalist" movements is a very emotional approach to the concept of Europe. The Europa-Union, for example, is not only convinced that "*Europe is a Community of destiny*" , but also adds that "*We can accept this common destiny, or we can shape it*".[75]

Interestingly, the strategy of the Europe-elites follows the theoretical concepts of national integration to an amazing degree. For example they all claim "*a common cultural and education policy to foster a sense of European identity in the European Union and its member states promoting unity in diversity and common values for all citizens*"[76]. Again, the same mechanisms are applied, which nationalist thinkers promoted in the past centuries: make the state a tool for national identity by enforcing common cultural policies.

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[71] Webpage European Movement - Presentation http://www.eurplace.org/orga/european.movement/pres-en.html

[72] Webpage UEF: From its origins to the present day http://www.eurplace.org/orga/uef/origineng.html

[73] Webpage Europa Union http://www.europa-web.de:80/europa/index.htm

[74] Webpage Paneuropa-Bewegung: Geschichte, Grundlagen und Ziele http://www.paneuropa.org/intl/de/ziele.html

[75] Webpage Europa Union: A Charta of European Identity - http://www.europa-web.de:80/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

[76]Webpage Europa Union: A Charta of European Identity - http://www.europa-web.de:80/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

Language also plays a role. Again, the elites clearly understand the importance of language and promote some "common language ground". The "European nationalist" claim "*the promotion of multi-lingualism. All Europeans should learn foreign languages as early as possible.*"[77]

Very radical groups can also be found among the group of "European Nationalists" movements. One is the Paneuropa Union. This organization is convinced that Europe is a very clearly defined community by religion: "*Our goal is to organize Europe as the continent of Christian values. Christianity is the soul of Europe. Thus, the Paneuropa Union fights against all tendencies which try to destroy the spiritual and moral power of Europe.*"[78] One can easily draw a parallel from this statement to excluding, emotional and total approaches of some historical nationalist movements.

Of course, "European nationalist" elites represent small and sometimes radical minorities and their political visions do not seem to be very realistical. However, they probably should not be underestimated. First, history has shown that unrealistic visions presented by minorities may turn into concrete political action later. The EU itself is an example for that phenomenon. Secondly, important politicians and founding fathers of the EU have joined the "European nationalists". The European Movement for example was headed by persons like Paul-Henry Spaak, Robert Schuman, Walter Hallstein, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The Union of European Federalists has had prominent members like Altiero Spinelli. Indeed these organizations seem to fall under the notion of influential elites, which have been discussed earlier in the theoretical part of this work.[79]

2.5	*Excursus*: Achieved Degree of European Identity within the Member States

How successful has the EU been in establishing the concept of a common identity, common history and common destiny? Of course, this query cannot be easily answered and raises complicated methodological questions of measuring shared identities in complex political entities. However, some indicators exist to quantify European identity. One of these tools is the so-called "Eurobarometer"[80]. The EU regularly carries out this statistical survey each year. The latest version was released in March 1999.

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[77] Webpage Europa Union: A Charta of European Identity - http://www.europa-web.de:80/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

[78] Webpage Die Paneuropa-Bewegung: Geschichte, Grundlagen und Ziele http://www.paneuropa.org/intl/de/ziele.html (translation BS)

[79] Compare to chapter 1.4 Other Strategies of Emotional Integration and Exclusion

[80] European Commission: Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union; Brussels; 1999

The "Eurobarometer 1999" sums up the question of a European identity in the following statement**:** **"***Although one can still not speak of the existence of a truly European identity, the majority of EU citizens feels to some extent European. However, since this is an issue where opinions differ greatly between countries, generalizations can be deceiving.***"**[81]

The high level of European identification in Luxembourg can be explained by the high proportion of citizens from other EU countries in this state. However, at 15%, these people still represent a minority. In all other countries, 10% or less of the population feel European only. Nonetheless, in seven countries people, who feel to some extent European are in the majority.("European only", "European and Nationality" and "Nationality and European"): Apart from Luxembourg (73%), these countries are Italy (69%), France (65%), Spain (63%), the Netherlands (59%), Belgium (53%) and Germany (50%). The three countries where national identity is clearly the prevalent sentiment are the UK (62%), Sweden (60%) and, to a slightly lesser extent, Portugal (56%).

The "Eurobarometer" also examines the factors for making people feel European or not.[82] Socio-demographic determinants play a large role apart from the home country. The first factor is age: people who came into adulthood prior to the 1950's are significantly less likely to feel to some extent European than people who grew up after the first European Treaty was signed. Also, as people become older they tend to identify more strongly with their own country. Education is another important factor, although education inter-relates with age. Thus, people who left school by the age of 15 or younger are most likely

European and National Identity

NET DIFFERENCE
Feeling European vs
Nationality only

L	15	13	45	23	50
I	5	8	56	29	40
F	7	9	49	35	30
E	4	6	53	34	29
NL	2	6	51	40	19
EU 15	4	7	43	43	11
B	6	6	41	44	9
D	4	9	37	46	4
GR	1	3	46	50	0
DK	3	3	42	52	-4
A	4	6	37	49	-2
IRL	1	4	42	51	-4
FIN	1	4	42	53	-6
P	3	3	36	56	-14
S	2	3	34	60	-21
UK	5	4	27	62	-25

■ % European only ☐ % European and nationality
▓ % Nationality and European ■ % Nationality only

Source: Survey no. 50.0 - Fieldwork Oct - Nov 1998
Standard Eurobarometer 50 - Fig. 3.9

Percentage 'don't know' not shown

[81] European Commission: Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union; Brussels; 1999; p. 59

to have a strong sense of national identity, while this is least likely among people who are still studying. On the economic activity scale, managers are most likely to feel European while retired people and people who look after the home are most likely to identify solely with their own nationality (again, older people are over-represented in these categories).

The results of the survey must be depressing for the European Union and European elites working towards a common identity. The polls show that all of the uniting strategies discussed above were able to convince only small parts of the populations of the Member countries. Only 11 Percent of all EU citizens answered that they see themselves as "only European" or "European and nationality". It also must be alarming for the supporters of a European identity that especially the old and under-educated people rather stick to their old nationalities than to Europe. Many national movements have succeeded because

There is a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans

Source: Survey no. 50.0 - Fieldwork Oct - Nov 1998
Standard Eurobarometer 50 - Fig. 3.10

Percentage 'don't know' not shown

they got the support from these "underprivileged" groups. Europe, in spite, seems to require a rational and intellectual way of thinking in order to identify with it. Thus, these *de luxe* conditions for European identity are rather contrary to the successful strategies used by nationalist movements.

There are indications that the EU sees this problem and tries to get closer to "nationalist approaches" to create identity. One nationalist strategy, which was analyzed before, is the creation or fostering of a cultural unity. It is interesting in this context that the Eurobarometer, for the first time in its history,

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[82] European Commission: Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union; Brussels; 1999; p. 59f

measured the feelings towards a common European cultural identity in 1999. Eurobarometer asked whether people agree or disagree that there is a European cultural identity that is shared by all Europeans.

The majority of Europeans say that there is no such thing as a European cultural identity (49 percent slightly or completely disagree with the statement "There is a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans" , only 39 percent slightly or completely agree)[83]. Many older, less well educated citizens of the EU did not have an opinion to the question of a common cultural identity.

[83] European Commission: Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European Union; Brussels; 1999; p. 60

Conclusion and Outlook:

9 May, 2050, Strasbourg - More than 5 Million Europeans from all regions of the nation have gathered together in the EU-capital to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the day when United Europe was founded in 1950. Ten-thousands of blue flags with the twelve stars symbolizing European unity decorated the streets. In a big demonstration, the citizens claimed the introduction of a third common language in kindergarten in all regions of Europe. The celebrations ended with a huge open air concert commemorating the great European composer Ludwig van Beethoven. The festival culminated in a demonstration of unity when all citizens commonly stroke up 'Ode to joy".

Nobody can predict whether such a scenario may actually turn into reality sometime in the future. Many political scientists would certainly argue "no" referring to the supra-national character of the political construct "European Union" and the low rates of European identification within the member states.

However, this work has argued that the European Union is actively pursuing nationalist strategies in order to unite the citizens of Europe. Ultimately, these strategies direct to feelings of national consciousness and thus stand for a tradition, which have lead to scenarios like the one described above.

The use of nationalist strategies by the European Union can be summed up in four points.

Firstly, the EU uses almost all symbols of national unity like flag, anthem and other attributes of a common identity. Secondly, the EU is trying to overcome the deficiency of a missing vernacular by enforcing multi- lingualism and establishing the new "language" of a common currency. Thirdly, the EU is seeking to change the perceptions of European culture and history: It reframes history into a common story, receives culture as a common culture and invents European traditions. Finally, the nationalist approach of the EU is fostered by radical elites who try to pursue "ideological engineering" on a European level.

On the other hand, this work has shown that the nationalist strategies of the EU do not seem to be very successful up to now. The majority of European citizens prefer traditional nations within the EU.

Two interesting research questions rise from this tension between nationalist strategies and missing awareness, which could be answered in future research papers.

First, why are the nationalist strategies, which have often worked towards integration, failing in the case of the EU? One reason certainly is the absence of a European public (no media, not enough multi-lingualism), which could transport and spread the nationalist feelings, symbols and views of history. [84] Also, the elites seem to fail in effectively disseminating their viewpoints.

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[84] Bartmann, Christoph: Kulturraum Europa? in: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit Europa am Scheideweg; München; 1998; p. 84

The second research question is, how will the European Union react to declining or stagnating degrees of European identity? Will it reinforce nationalist strategies or will it try new forms of political identification and legitimization?

These additional questions, however, do not go against the central thesis of this work, which proved that a great variety of nationalist strategies have been adopted by the European Union in order to achieve its broader integration and legitimization goals.

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http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm
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